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This paper analyzes optimal linear taxes on labor income and savings in a standard two-period 
life-cycle model with endogenous leisure demands in both periods and non-insurable income 
risks. Households are subject to skill shocks in both periods of the life-cycle. We allow for 
completely general skill processes including those with persistence in skill shocks. We 
demonstrate that capital taxes are optimal since they reduce moral hazard in social insurance 
in two distinct ways: i) capital taxes reduce labor supply distortions on second-period labor 
supply, since second-period labor supply and saving are substitutes, ii) capital taxes reduce 
distortions in first-period labor supply by allowing for a lower level of labor taxes, although 
this effect is partially off-set because first-period labor supply and saving are complements. 
Capital taxes will be more attractive for social insurance if a larger part of risk is realized in 
the first period of the life-cycle. Our results suggest that taxing (retirement) saving is optimal 
to boost the retirement age and to reduce the tax-burden on working-age individuals. 
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1 Introduction
Should capital income be taxed or not? This is one of the oldest and most important
questions in public ¯nance. Ever since the seminal work of Pigou (1928) the desirabil-
ity of taxing capital income has been widely debated. Our paper contributes to this
long-standing debate by highlighting the role of non-insurable labor income risks. We
show that under risk the optimal capital tax is always non-zero and this has important
implications for designing pension reforms and the tax treatment of retirement savings.
Taxes on capital income are commonly seen as an ever-increasing tax on consumption
in the more distant future. Ramsey-principles therefore insist that in the long-run capital
income should not be taxed when in¯nite horizon models are analyzed (cf. Chamley,
1986; Judd, 1985, 1999). Since taxes on capital incomes are di®erentiated consumption
taxes, these results are intimately linked to the debate on the desirability of di®erentiated
commodity taxes. Sandmo (1974, 1976), Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976), and Deaton (1979)
have demonstrated that commodity taxes should not be di®erentiated in ¯nite horizon
models as long as preferences over consumption goods are weakly separable from leisure
under non-linear income taxation. With linear instruments the subutility function over
consumption goods needs to be homothetic as well. This result is generally referred to in
the literature as the Atkinson-Stiglitz-theorem.
Our paper investigates the desirability of capital income taxes when insurance markets
are missing and individuals are subject to earnings risk. To that end, we develop a
standard two-period life-cycle model where individuals optimally decide on consumption
and leisure choices in both periods. Individuals could be hit by a non-insurable skill shock
in each period of their life-cycle. Ex ante, all individuals are identical. Ex post they
di®er due to the realizations of these skill shocks. We allow for completely general skill-
processes that could feature persistence over the life-cycle. Capital markets are assumed
to be perfect. A government with full commitment designs an optimal second-best social
insurance package consisting of state-independent transfers and linear, time-invariant
taxes on labor and capital incomes.
We ¯nd that capital income taxes are non-zero in an optimal social insurance policy
and should be positive under weak conditions that are likely to be ful¯lled in practice.
We ¯nd a generic role for capital income taxes even when adopting standard preferences
that render capital income taxes zero in the absence of risk. Hence, we demonstrate that
the Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) theorem of zero commodity tax di®erentiation breaks
down under risk. We show that capital income taxes could directly boost labor supply or
2they allow for lower levels of labor taxation, so that labor supply is indirectly stimulated
while maintaining the same level of insurance. We show that capital income taxes might
be used as well directly for social insurance if labor income risks are mainly concentrated
in the ¯rst stage of the life-cycle.
Our paper contributes to the existing literature in a number of ways. First, Cremer
and Gahvari (1995a, 1995b, 1999) have investigated the desirability of commodity tax
di®erentiation in risky environments. Using linear policies, Cremer and Gahvari (1995a)
have shown that the Atkinson-Stiglitz theorem fails in a special case of our more general
model. In particular, Cremer and Gahvari (1995a) argue that commodity tax di®eren-
tiation helps to o®set over- or underconsumption { relative to the ¯rst-best rules { of
pre-committed and post-committed goods, i.e., goods that are consumed before or after
the skill shock materializes. Translated to our setting this would imply that the govern-
ment would like to tax precautionary saving. However, in our view their explanation for
this result needs to be revised. We demonstrate that in their setting, the capital tax does
not reduce the exposure to labor market risk. Hence, the capital tax has no additional
insurance gains in comparison with the labor tax, while upsetting the optimal private
response to earnings risk by taxing savings in a distortionary way. Instead, we show
that the capital tax boosts labor supply, and thereby indirectly reduces moral hazard in
social insurance. Consequently, positive capital taxes are optimal to reduce labor market
distortions, and are not employed to reduce precautionary saving.1
Second, Diamond and Mirrlees (1978, 1986) and papers in the `new dynamic public
¯nance' literature show that intertemporal wedges in consumption choices are optimal
(see e.g. Golosov et al. 2003, 2006; Kocherlakota, 2005; Golosov and Tsyvinski, 2006;
Albanesi and Sleet, 2006; Diamond, 2006). Labor supply optimally carries a wedge
(i.e., is distorted) for insurance purposes. Moreover, there is an intertemporal wedge
in consumption choices, indicating a potential role for capital income taxation or asset
testing. Under particular assumptions such as independent skill shocks or time-varying
non-linear policies that can be conditioned on entire earnings histories (`perfect record
keeping'), the intertemporal consumption wedges can be implemented as marginal taxes
on savings. By showing that capital income taxes are optimally used to boost labor
supply, our paper contributes to the understanding as to why the intertemporal wedges
in consumption are optimal. Indeed, the only mechanism whereby incentive compatibility
constraints can be relaxed is that intertemporal consumption wedges boost labor supply.
Hence, taxes on saving are optimal only if they reduce moral hazard in social insurance.
In addition, by directly implementing the optimal allocations with time-invariant linear
tax instruments without record keeping we also demonstrate that the basic results derived
1Cremer and Gahvari (1995b) show that the results carry over to non-linear instruments as well. Cre-
mer and Gahvari (1999) extend their previous approaches by allowing for di®erent types of commitment.
Nevertheless, also in these papers the main argument is that di®erentiated commodity taxes mitigate
socially ine±cient under- and over-consumption.
3in the new dynamic public ¯nance literature are robust to (very) large deviations from
the informational requirements to implement time-dependent, non-linear policies.
Third, we contribute to the existing optimal tax literature under earnings risk and we
show that capital income taxes are employed in an optimal social insurance package in a
wide class of standard two-period life-cycle models with risk. The model of Cremer and
Gahvari (1995a) is a special case of our model where labor supply in the ¯rst period is
exogenous. This setting also resembles the models of Diamond and Mirrlees (1978, 1986)
where individuals can retire early. In this setting, second-period labor supply can be
interpreted as the retirement decision. We will denote this the `working-for-retirement'
model. Alternatively, we also analyze a case where second-period labor supply is assumed
to be exogenous, and individuals only work in the ¯rst period. This `saving-for-retirement'
model is similar to the models analyzed by Ordover and Phelps (1979) and Atkinson
and Sandmo (1980). We demonstrate that capital income should optimally be taxed
at positive rates in both sub-models. In particular, taxing savings helps to o®-set the
tax distortions on retirement in the working-for-retirement model, since a lower level
of saving stimulates later retirement. In the saving-for-retirement model, subsidies on
saving boost labor supply of the young workers, and thereby reduce moral hazard in
social insurance. However, the higher level of labor taxes needed to ¯nance the saving
subsidies more than o®-sets this positive e®ect on labor supply. Intuitively, both tax
instruments feature social insurance gains. Hence, taxes (not subsidies) on saving are
optimal so as to smooth the dead weight costs of social insurance over both the labor and
capital tax bases. In our full model, we incorporate endogenous leisure demands in both
periods of the life-cycle. The optimal capital tax tends to be positive for both reasons
discussed in the two special cases. In contrast, capital taxes are less attractive if labor
income taxes are relatively more e±cient to insure income risks, since labor taxes reduce
both ¯rst- and second-period earnings risk, whereas capital income taxes can only reduce
¯rst-period income risk.
Numerous other papers have elucidated the conditions under which capital income
taxes are not optimally zero. If horizons are not in¯nite and preferences do not meet
the required separability conditions, capital income might be taxed or subsidized on a
net basis. In particular, when marginal rate of substitution between future and current
consumption increases with labor e®ort, capital incomes should optimally be taxed so
as to (partially) o®-set the tax distortions of the income tax on labor supply. See for
example Ordover and Phelps (1979), Atkinson and Sandmo (1980), Erosa and Gervais
(2002), Golosov et al. (2006), and Diamond (2006). Aiyagari (1995) allows for incomplete
¯nancial markets such that individuals can be borrowing constrained. Capital income
taxes redistribute resources from unconstrained towards constrained phases of the life-
cycle, and thereby help to complete missing borrowing markets. Saez (2002), Boadway
and Pestieau (2003), and Diamond (2006) allow for heterogeneous preferences. They
4show that when discount rates decrease with ability, it is optimal to tax capital income in
a redistributive program even under separable preferences. In case governments cannot
commit to future tax plans, optimal time-consistent capital taxes might also be (very)
high, see, for example, Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Fischer (1980).
Our paper has substantial policy relevance. In the upcoming decades, many countries
are confronted with the ageing of work forces, resulting in ¯nancing problems for PAYG-
pensions and health care. Our results indicate that if governments aim to promote later
retirement, they should not strengthen incentives to save for retirement at the same time.
We show that stronger incentives for retirement saving will promote earlier retirement,
not later retirement. Similarly, if governments would like to promote labor supply of
working-age individuals, they should not stimulate (pension) savings either. For a given
level of social insurance, the rise in the tax burden needed to ¯nance the saving subsidies
reduces labor supply of working-age individuals more than the saving subsidies can o®set.
Thus, the trade-o® between incentives and insurance worsens as a result.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the baseline
model. Section 3 derives the optimal tax rules for optimal labor and capital taxes.
Section 4 derives the optimal tax structure in the `saving-for-retirement' model. Section
5 derives the optimal tax structure in the `working-for-retirement' model. Section 6 gives
the solution to the complete model. Section 7 concludes. An appendix contains the
technical details of the derivations.
2 Model
2.1 Households
There is a continuum of in¯nitely small households who live for two periods. In each pe-
riod households decide upon their consumption and labor supply. Perfect capital markets
allow individuals to borrow and lend at constant real interest rate r. In addition, labor
markets are frictionless and the wage per e±ciency unit of labor equals one.2 Insurance
markets to insure idiosyncratic labor income risks are missing, which can be due to moral
hazard, adverse selection, and contract incompleteness (see, e.g., Sinn, 1996). By the law
of large numbers idiosyncratic individual risk washes out in aggregate and there is no
aggregate (systematic) risk.
Households are identical ex ante, but not ex post. In each period i = 1;2, their
productivity per hour worked or `skill' µi is stochastic. The joint set of possible realizations








, where µ1 > 0 and µ2 > 0. µ ´ fµ1;µ2g 2 £ denotes




the set of realizations of µi for
2Constant real interest and wage rates would be obtained in a small open economy with perfect capital
mobility and perfect substitution of di®erent labor types in production.
5i = 1;2. p(µ) is the probability distribution function, which attaches a probability p(µ)
to skill history µ. The conditional probability that µ2 is realized given µ1 is denoted by
p(µ2jµ1). The (life-time) expectation E[:] over variable x(µ) as of period one is de¯ned as
E[x(µ)] ´
P
£ x(µ)p(µ), whereas the conditional expectation of a variable as of period
two, given a particular realization of the skill shock µ1 in period one, is denoted by
E[x(µ2)jµ1] ´
P
£2 x(µ2)p(µ2jµ1). We allow for fully general stochastic processes for
the evolution of skills, hence there could be persistence in skill shocks over time if their
correlation is positive. For notational simplicity we harmlessly normalize the expectation
of the ¯rst skill shock to one: E[µ1] ´ 1.
ci denotes consumption in period i = 1;2. Similarly, li is labor supply in period
i. In period one, households choose labor supply and consumption before the shock
realizes, hence c1 and l1 are `committed' goods (Cremer and Gahvari, 1995a, 1995b).
When entering the second period, households carry forward a stochastic level of assets
a(µ1) and ¯rst determine how much labor l2 (µ1) to supply. Hence, second-period labor
supply only depends on shock µ1 and not on µ2. Second-period consumption c2 (µ1;µ2) is
determined residually.3
We follow common practice in the optimal tax literature under risk by assuming that
expected utility U is an additively separable function over consumption and labor supply
in both periods (see also Cremer and Gahvari, 1995a, 1995b; Golosov et al., 2003, 2006;
Diamond, 2006):









i < 0; 0 < ¯ < 1; i = 1;2;
where sub-utilities ui and vi satisfy the Inada-conditions. ¯ is the discount factor, which
captures the time-preference of the household. We assume decreasing absolute risk aver-
sion in consumption, which necessarily implies u000
i > 0.
The government employs linear tax instruments. The informational requirements
for these instruments are that the government only observes aggregate tax bases. In
particular, the government levies a linear tax on labor earnings in both periods at rate t.
In addition, the household receives non-state dependent transfers T in the ¯rst period. We
do not explicitly allow for a second-period income transfer. This instrument is redundant,
since individuals can freely allocate the ¯rst-period transfer over the life-cycle by having
perfect access to capital markets. Finally, a linear tax at rate ¿ is levied on interest
income from savings.4
3We have also derived the model where labor supply in each period is chosen after the shock has
realized. The optimal tax expressions remain the same. However, they contain the expected elasticity of
¯rst-period labor income rather than the deterministic elasticity. The expected elasticity of second-period
labor also depends on the second skill shock. See also Anderberg and Andersson (2003).
4Cremer and Gahvari (1995a) study a similar setting with only second-period labor supply using dif-
6We restrict the analysis to linear policies. Linear tax systems are always incentive
compatible, since households with favorable skill shocks cannot gain by mimicking house-
holds with unfavorable shocks, because the tax system does not discriminate tax rates
by levels of earnings or levels of assets. Therefore, the optimal second-best allocation
can directly be implemented as a decentralized competitive market outcome with taxes.
Non-linear policies have been extensively analyzed in, for example, Golosov et al. (2003),
Kocherlakota (2005), Golosov et al. (2006), and Diamond (2006). Non-linear instruments
are much more demanding in terms of information as they require veri¯ability of labor
incomes and savings at the individual level, and also need to be di®erentiated over time.
Optimal non-linear policies also need to respect incentive compatibility constraints. Gen-
erally, in dynamic optimal tax models with risk optimal second-best allocations cannot
be implemented with non-linear instruments unless speci¯c assumptions are made on the
dynamics of the skill process or the set of available government instruments (e.g., record
keeping), see for example Golosov et al. (2003), Kocherlakota (2005), Albanesi and Sleet
(2006), and Golosov and Tsyvinski (2006). We do neither impose any restrictions on the
skill process nor require perfect record keeping.
In the ¯rst period, the household works and earns µ1l1 in gross labor earnings. The
¯rst-period budget constraint states that total consumption equals net labor income
minus saving a(µ1):
c1 = (1 ¡ t)µ1l1 + T ¡ a(µ1); 8µ1 2 £1: (2)
In the second-period, the household earns net labor income (1 ¡ t)µ2l2 (µ1) and interest
income ra(µ1) on assets carried forward from period one. Interest income is taxed at °at
rate ¿. Hence, the second-period budget reads as
c2 (µ2;µ1) = (1 ¡ t)µ2l2 (µ1) + (1 + (1 ¡ ¿)r)a(µ1); 8fµ1;µ2g 2 £: (3)
In the remainder, we will employ R ´ 1 + (1 ¡ ¿)r to denote the net interest factor.
The household maximizes life-time utility by choosing the optimal levels of consump-
tion ci and labor supply li. We solve this problem backwards. Individuals enter the second
period with a stochastic level of assets a(µ1). Given this level of assets, and before the
second shock µ2 materializes, the individual solves the subprogram:
max
fl2(µ1)g
E[u2((1 ¡ t)µ2l2 (µ1) + Ra(µ1)) ¡ v2 (l2)jµ1]; 8µ1 2 £1; (4)
ferentiated commodity taxes. In the absence of non-labor income, such as bequests, uniform commodity
taxes are equivalent to a proportional tax on labor income, without taxes on capital income. Non-uniform
commodity taxes are equivalent to a labor income tax supplemented with taxes or subsidies on capital
income.
7which yields the following ¯rst-order condition for second-period labor supply:
(1 ¡ t)E[u
0
2 (µ2)µ2jµ1] = v
0
2 (l2 (µ1)); 8µ1 2 £1: (5)
Consequently, we can write for the conditional expectation of second-period indirect
utility:
E[W (µ2;a(µ1))jµ1] ´ E
h






; 8µ1 2 £1; (6)
where hats are used to denote the optimal values of c2 and l2. Taking expectations as of
period one on both sides yields expected indirect utility in period two as a function of
saving and the skill shocks:
E[W (a(µ1);µ1;µ2)] ´ E
h




















In the ¯rst stage, individuals choose c1 and l1 before the shock µ1 realizes, conditional




U = u1 (c1) ¡ v1 (l1) + ¯E[W (a(µ1);µ1;µ2)] (8)
= u1 (c1) ¡ v1 (l1) + ¯E[W ((1 ¡ t)µ1l1 + T ¡ c1;µ1;µ2)];
where we substituted saving from the individual budget constraint in equation (2) in the
second line. The ¯rst-period labor supply equation is governed by
v
0
1 (l1) = (1 ¡ t)¯RE[u
0
2 (c2 (µ1;µ2))µ1] (9)




1 (c1) = ¯RE[u
0
2 (c2 (µ1;µ2))] (10)
A higher real return on saving R or a higher discount factor ¯ make individuals more
willing to save by substituting current for future consumption.5
We introduce the risk premia of ¯rst- and second-period labor supply as the normalized















¼i denotes the marginal welfare loss due to skill risk in period i expressed in monetary
units. Because marginal utility of income is declining with income, the risk premia are
non-negative in both periods. Given that risk a®ects labor earnings in a multiplicative
way, larger labor supply raises the risk-exposure of households to labor market shocks.
Using these de¯nitions, we can derive that the labor supply equations in both periods










= (1 ¡ ¼2)(1 ¡ t)E[µ2]: (14)
Hence, individuals get stronger incentives to supply more labor if the tax rate is lower or
if labor income is less risky (lower ¼i). Larger labor market risk, as indicated by a larger
¼i, acts as an implicit tax on labor supply, since risk averse individuals reduce their labor
e®ort if the latter raises their exposure to skill shocks.
Indirect expected utility of the household can be written as a function V over the
policy variables (T;t;R):











where the hats indicate the optimized values for consumption and labor, which follow
from solving the three ¯rst-order conditions (5), (9), and (10), and the household budget
constraints (2) and (3) for c1, c2, l1, l2 and a. Note that we have suppressed the skill
shocks for notational simplicity. We will continue to do so in the remainder of the paper.

















((1 ¡ »1)(1 ¡ t)l1 ¡ c1 + T)
R
; (18)
where ´ ´ u0
1 (c1) = ¯RE[u0
2] is the marginal utility of private income, and »1 and »2 are













The insurance characteristic »i gives the marginal welfare loss of income risk in period i
expressed in monetary units. In particular, (1 ¡ »i)E[µili] is the certainty equivalent of
risky labor income µili.
To solve for the optimal tax structure below, we employ the risk-adjusted Slutsky
equations. To that end, we de¯ne the expenditure function X (t;R;V ) as the minimum
level of non-labor income T required to attain expected indirect utility V . X (:) can be
obtained from setting X (t;R;V ) ´ T for the optimal level of indirect utility V as given
in equation (15). The compensated demand functions are then de¯ned as
l
c
i (t;R;V ) ´ li (t;R;X (t;R;V )); (21)
c
c
i (t;R;V ) ´ ci (t;R;X (t;R;V )); (22)
where the superscript c denotes a compensated change. By totally di®erentiating the
compensated demand functions for given V , and using Shephard's lemma we obtain the



















































































We assume a benevolent government, which has full commitment. We abstract from a
government revenue requirement without loss of generality. The government optimally
provides social insurance by choosing policy instruments T, t, and R, such that expected
indirect utility V (T;t;R) of the household is maximized.
By the law of large numbers individual idiosyncratic risks cancel in the aggregate and
10we ¯nd that the government budget constraint is given by
(1 + r)tl1 + tE[µ2l2] + (1 + r ¡ R)[(1 ¡ t)l1 ¡ c1 + T] = (1 + r)T: (29)
All labor incomes are deterministic at the aggregate level. However, this does not imply
that the expectations operator on second-period labor income vanishes. The reason is that
skill shocks µi may not be independent over time. If there is a correlation between both
skill shocks, second-period income will depend on the realization of the ¯rst-period shock
µ1 and the second-period shock µ2. As a result we have E[µ2l2 (µ1)] 6= E[µ2]E[l2 (µ1)].
Only if skill shocks are independent, i.e., if cov [µ1;µ2] = 0, we obtain E[µ2l2 (µ1)] =
E[µ2]E[l2 (µ1)].
3 Optimal taxation
The Lagrangian for maximizing social welfare is given by
max
fT;t;Rg
L ´ V (T;t;R) + ¸[tl1(1 + r) + tE[µ2l2]] (30)
+ ¸[(1 + r ¡ R)((1 ¡ t)l1 ¡ c1 + T) ¡ (1 + r)T];
where ¸ is the deterministic shadow value of public resources.






















2]((1 ¡ »1)Rl1 + (1 ¡ »2)E[µ2l2]) + ¸(Rl1 + E[µ2l2]) (32)

















2](1 ¡ »1)(1 ¡ t)l1 ¡ c1 + T) ¡ ¸((1 ¡ t)l1 ¡ c1 + T) (33)













From the ¯rst-order condition for the lump{sum transfer in equation (31) follows that
the expected social value of transferring one euro to the household (b) should be equal to

























6We assume that these necessary ¯rst-order conditions are also su±cient to describe the optimum
allocation, i.e., the second-order conditions for the government program are ful¯lled.
11The ¯rst-order condition for the labor tax rate in (32) can be rewritten by substituting






@t in (23), (24) and (25), using the
de¯nition for b in (34), and rearranging to ¯nd
!»1 + (1 ¡ !)»2 +
t
1 ¡ t
(!"l1t + (1 ¡ !)"l2t) +
¿r=R
1 ¡ t



















c1 designate the compensated
labor tax elasticities of ¯rst-period labor income, expected second-period labor income,
and ¯rst-period consumption, respectively. ! ´
Rl1
Rl1+E[µ2l2] is the share of ¯rst-period
labor income in expected total labor income. ° ´
Rc1
Rl1+E[µ2l2] is the share of ¯rst-period
consumption in expected total labor income.
Similarly, we can simplify the ¯rst-order condition for the capital tax in (33) by






@R (see equations (26)




(!"l1R + (1 ¡ !)"l2R) +
¿r=R
1 ¡ t



















c1 denote the compensated elastic-
ities of ¯rst-period labor income, expected second-period labor income, and ¯rst-period
consumption with respect to the interest factor, respectively.
In the appendix we formally derive all the behavioral elasticities, which we have signed
under three parameter restrictions, see also Table 1. Our parameter restrictions ensure
that the elasticities qualitatively have the same signs as the comparative statics results
of the model in the absence of income risk.
12Table 1: Summary of elasticities
Elasticities
"c1t ´ ¡ ²

































































(1¡t) + (1 ¡ ¼1)!§1"1½1 + (1 ¡ ¼2)(1 ¡ !)§2"2½1 > 0
² ´ (1 ¡ ¼1)!"1 + (1 ¡ ¼2)(1 ¡ !)"2 > 0
± ´ ¡
(1¡°)=½2
(1¡t) + (1 ¡ ¼1)!"1 (1 ¡ §1) ¡ (1 ¡ ¼2)(1 ¡ !)"2§2
Parameter restrictions
i) ± < 0, ii) §1 ¼ §2, iii) ¼0
1 > ¼1 , §1 < 1
First, "c2R > 0 holds independently of any assumption on parameters. Hence, a larger
net return on saving boosts second period consumption. Moreover, "c1R < 0, since we
assume ± < 0 so that the standard substitution e®ect in saving dominates the insurance
e®ect of taxes on saving. The insurance e®ect stems from the fact that taxes on saving
help to reduce the exposure to ¯rst-period labor market shocks by reducing the variance
in saving.
Second, "lt1 < 0 and "lt2 < 0. Under wage risk, the elasticities of labor supply with
respect to the labor tax are generally ambiguous. By reducing the variance in earnings,
a higher tax reduces the risk-exposure of individuals to adverse labor market shocks so
that labor supply is ceteris paribus stimulated (see also Menezes and Wang, 2005). The









i ]E[µi]. This elasticity measures the percentage change in
the certainty equivalent of wages with respect to a one percent change in expected wages
in period i.7 However, the standard, negative substitution e®ect of higher taxes on labor
supply pulls in the opposite direction. We assume that §1 ¼ §2 so that the substitution
e®ects in labor supply dominate the insurance e®ects.
Third, "c1t < 0 and "c2t < 0. These are unambiguous. The intuition is that a higher
labor tax lowers the price of leisure and induces substitution away from consumption
towards leisure.
7§i can be compared to the `coe±cient of residual income progression', which is the elasticity of
after-tax income with respect to before-tax income, see, e.g., Musgrave and Musgrave (1976).
13Fourth, "l1R > 0 and "l2R < 0. A higher ¯nancial return R induces individuals to have
relatively more consumption and leisure in the second-period and less consumption and
leisure in the ¯rst period. Due to intertemporal substitution in leisure, labor supply in
the ¯rst period increases and labor supply in the second period decreases. In addition,
there are wealth e®ects on labor supply in both periods due to intertemporal substi-
tution e®ects in consumption. Intuitively, a lower (higher) ¯rst-period (second-period)
level of consumption raises (lowers) marginal utility of consumption in the ¯rst (second)
period. Consequently, in the ¯rst period the marginal willingness to pay for leisure,
i.e., the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption, decreases and
labor supply expands. Similarly, in the second period the marginal willingness to pay
for leisure increases, so that labor supply diminishes. Thus, intertemporal substitution
e®ects in both leisure and consumption increase ¯rst-period labor supply and decrease
second-period labor supply. Moreover, in case of "l1R, the interest rate also has a direct,
positive e®ect on the e®ective ¯rst-period wage rate by increasing its net present value in
terms of second period consumption, which is the num¶ eraire commodity. Whilst "l2R < 0
can be signed independently of any assumption on parameters, "l1R can turn ambiguous
under risk. If ± < 0, a su±cient condition for "l1R > 0 is that the `elasticity of residual
risk aversion' in the ¯rst period should be smaller than one, i.e., §1 ´
1¡¼0
1
1¡¼1 < 1, which is
equivalent to assuming ¼0
1 > ¼1. This restriction is harmless when the bivariate distribu-
tion of skill shocks is normal and should also hold more generally under mild conditions
(see appendix). The imposed parameter restrictions are summarized in the last row of
Table 1.
To gain intuition for the optimal tax structure we will ¯rst discuss two special cases
before turning to the interpretation of the complete model. In the ¯rst case we assume
that ¯rst-period labor supply is exogenous and there is no ¯rst-period labor income
risk. We label this the working-for-retirement model, as we could interpret second-period
labor supply as the retirement decision. This structure of the model corresponds to the
setting analyzed in Cremer and Gahvari (1995a, 1995b) and is similar to Diamond and
Mirrlees (1978, 1986). In the second case, we assume that second-period labor supply
is exogenous and there is no second-period income risk. This model is denoted as the
saving-for-retirement model. This structure corresponds to the deterministic analyses in
Ordover and Phelps (1979) and Atkinson and Sandmo (1980).
4 Working-for-retirement: exogenous ¯rst-period lei-
sure
In case ¯rst-period labor supply is exogenous and not risky we have: "l1t = "l1R = »1 = 0.
Labor supply can in this case also be interpreted as the retirement decision. Hence, we
14¯nd from equations (35) and (36) the following ¯rst-order conditions for the optimal labor
and capital income tax






















Expression (37) demonstrates that the labor tax is set in such a way that the marginal
bene¯ts in terms of larger social insurance (1 ¡ !)»2 are equated to the net marginal dead
weight costs of doing so. The net costs consist of two e®ects. First, a higher labor tax
distorts labor supply more heavily as indicated by ¡ t
1¡t (1 ¡ !)"l2t > 0. Second, provided
that capital income is taxed and households thus tend to consume too much in the ¯rst




The intuition for (38) is simpler. Taxes on savings are used for e±ciency reasons
only, since the capital tax base is deterministic. Therefore, capital taxes do not reduce
the variance in risky labor earnings and the insurance characteristic »2 does not play a
role. Thus, taxing savings does not yield insurance bene¯ts. The only role of the tax on
saving is to mitigate the distortions on labor supply. The ¯rst term on the right-hand side
gives the bene¯ts of smaller labor supply distortions (¡ t
1¡t (1 ¡ !)"l2R > 0). A larger
capital tax boosts second-period labor supply, since a capital tax generates a wealth e®ect
on second-period labor supply due to intertemporal substitution e®ects in consumption.
Note that there is no direct intertemporal substitution in leisure demand with leisure
being chosen in one period only. The second term represents the costs of a saving tax in
terms of a distorted pattern of consumption over the life-cycle (
¿r=R
1¡t °"c1R < 0).









^ t > 0: (39)
Equation (39) demonstrates that a dual income tax with both positive taxes on capital
income and labor income is optimal as long as the labor tax is used for insurance (t > 0).
Below we will show that this is indeed the case. By boosting labor supply the capital tax
alleviates the labor tax distortions associated with insuring labor income risks. Savings
and second-period labor supply are substitutes. Therefore, taxing savings helps to reduce
moral hazard in labor supply. The stronger the complementarity between ¯rst-period
consumption and second-period labor supply, the larger is "l2R, and the higher should be
the capital tax. If the distortions in saving are larger, "c1R increases, and optimal capital
income taxes should be set at lower levels. If more consumption is allocated towards the
second-period of the life-cycle, ° is smaller and capital taxes are less distortionary. Hence,
15optimal capital taxes can be higher. Similarly, if relatively more labor income is earned
in the second period, (1 ¡ !) is larger and the larger are the e±ciency gains of taxes on
capital income. Note that optimal capital taxes would only be zero when savings and
labor supply would not be substitutes ("l2R = 0), capital income taxes would be in¯nitely
distortionary ("c1R = 1), or second-period labor income would be zero (! = 1). None of
these conditions would be ful¯lled with standard preferences.
By using the optimal dual income tax we can obtain the following expression for the
optimal labor tax at the optimal capital tax:
^ t







The expression for the optimal labor tax illuminates the trade-o® between insurance
(numerator) and incentives (denominator). The optimal labor tax increases with the
insurance characteristic of labor income. The more risky is second-period labor income,
the larger is »2, and the larger are the social gains from insurance. The optimal labor tax
decreases with the compensated tax elasticity of labor supply. The higher is the elasticity
"l2t < 0 in absolute value, the more labor supply responds to taxation, and the lower
should be the optimal labor tax rate. From the denominator in the expression for social
insurance follows that capital taxes allow for more social insurance { ceteris paribus »2 {
if labor income is a stronger substitute for savings, i.e., when
"l2R
"c1R > 0 is larger. By taxing
capital income, the government reduces moral hazard in social insurance, and optimal
labor taxes can be set higher accordingly. Thus, positive capital income taxes allow for
more social insurance. When the government would not be interested in providing social
insurance (»2 = 0) both the labor and capital tax would be zero.
Note that the capital tax is optimally employed irrespective of the preference structure
of the households. In particular, the elasticities are not zero even when preferences are
separable and sub-utility over consumption is homothetic, cf. the elasticities in Table 1.
These are the standard conditions to obtain zero optimal capital income taxes (no com-
modity tax di®erentiation) in deterministic models with linear instruments (cf. Sandmo,
1974; Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1976; Deaton, 1979; Atkinson and Sandmo, 1980). Hence,
the Atkinson-Stiglitz no commodity tax-di®erentiation result breaks down under risk, as
has been demonstrated before by Cremer and Gahvari (1995a).
Our analysis replicates the ¯ndings in Cremer and Gahvari (1995a), but sheds a
di®erent light on their explanation, which also a®ects the interpretation of optimal non-
linear policies in Cremer and Gahvari (1995b). Cremer and Gahvari (1995a) cast their
model in terms of optimal commodity taxes rather than labor income and capital income
taxes. They argue that commodity taxes should optimally be di®erentiated. In particular,
the tax on the `pre-committed' commodity (c1) should be lower than that on the `post-
16committed' commodity (c2). This ¯nding corresponds to our result of the desirability of
capital income taxes.
Cremer and Gahvari (1995a,b) argue that commodity tax di®erentiation is optimal to
reduce under- and over-consumption of pre- and post-committed goods. If this argument
would be correct, there would be (precautionary) oversaving in our setting, which the
government would like to correct by levying a tax on saving. We think that this expla-
nation needs to be revised. In particular, if there is over- (under-)consumption, there
would be an externality in consumption choices. Taxing (subsidizing) such goods would
therefore raise social welfare. This is, however, not the case, since individuals optimally
reduce their risk exposure through self-insurance in the form of precautionary saving.
We have shown above that taxes on saving do not reduce income risk, since the saving
tax base is deterministic. Levying a saving tax (and rebating the revenue in the form of
transfers) would therefore not reduce the exposure of households to income risk, while
at the same time it would create (larger) distortions in the saving decision. Hence, such
a policy cannot be welfare improving. The reason why commodity tax di®erentiation is
optimal is that such a policy alleviates moral hazard problems in social insurance. A
capital tax therefore reduces the distortions on labor supply that are caused by the labor
tax. Hence, it allows for more social insurance in Cremer and Gahvari (1995a,b) and in
our model. Indeed, Lemma 1 in Cremer and Gahvari (1995a) implies complementarity
between (second-period) labor supply and ¯rst-period consumption, like in our model.
Finally, if one interprets labor supply as the retirement decision, our results indicate
that (retirement) savings should optimally be taxed as long as the labor tax directly
distorts the retirement decision. Consequently, in an optimal social insurance scheme it
is not desirable to have actuarially neutral pension saving schemes, i.e., a zero net tax on
pension saving. Moreover, if the aim is to raise the e®ective retirement age, this could be
indirectly achieved by increasing the tax burden on (pension) savings.
Proposition 1. (Exogenous ¯rst-period leisure) The optimal capital tax is positive. The
capital tax is not used for social insurance, but only to o®-set distortions on second-
period labor supply. The optimal capital tax increases with the complementarity between
¯rst-period consumption and second-period labor supply, and if capital taxes are less dis-
tortionary.
5 Saving-for-retirement: exogenous second-period lei-
sure
Our second special case is concerned with exogenous and non-stochastic second-period
labor income: "l2t = "l2R = »2 = 0. In this case, one can view ¯rst-period labor supply as
working from the young and savings are made to ¯nance retirement consumption only.
17From equations (35) and (36), the expressions for the optimal taxes on labor income and























Equation (41) is the optimum condition of the labor tax where the e®ective marginal
insurance bene¯ts (!»1 > 0), are equated with the marginal e±ciency costs of the labor
tax. The net marginal costs of employing a larger labor tax consist of two elements. First,






!"l1t > 0. Second, intertemporal distortions will be smaller when the





°"c1t < 0. Intuitively, the labor tax reduces
¯rst-period consumption demand, and this mitigates overconsumption in the ¯rst period
resulting from a pre-existing, positive capital income tax. When the capital income tax
is zero, only the labor tax determines the distortions in labor supply.
Equation (42) is the optimum condition for the capital income tax. The marginal in-
surance bene¯ts (!»1 > 0) are equal to the marginal e±ciency costs of the capital income
tax. In contrast to the previous case (see section 4), the capital income tax now features
insurance bene¯ts, since savings are stochastic. Indeed, a larger variance in ¯rst-period
income shocks gives a larger variance in savings, since individuals with lower ¯rst-period
labor income save less. The costs of employing the capital tax for social insurance are
two-fold. First, a larger capital income tax entails larger intertemporal distortions in





°"c1R > 0. This term was also present before.
Second, a larger capital income tax exacerbates the labor tax distortions by acting as





!"l1R > 0. Intuitively,
the capital tax reduces ¯rst-period labor supply, since intertemporal substitution in con-
sumption provokes a wealth e®ect on leisure demand in period one. The capital tax also
a®ects labor supply via the tax wedge on labor. In particular, the capital tax changes the
relative price of ¯rst-period labor supply in terms of second-period consumption. The
capital tax did not feature in the tax wedge on labor in the previous model, because
the capital tax does not a®ect the relative price of second-period labor supply in terms
of second-period consumption. Again, there is no direct intertemporal substitution in
leisure, since individuals consume leisure only in the ¯rst-period.
Compared to the previous model, the cross-elasticity of labor supply with respect to
the net interest rate has switched in sign. A larger capital tax lowers the net return on
saving and raises ¯rst-period consumption relative to second-period consumption. As a
result, individuals would like to substitute ¯rst-period consumption for ¯rst-period leisure
18and ¯rst-period labor supply falls. Consequently, saving and ¯rst-period labor supply are
complements. Capital income taxes therefore do not reduce labor market distortions,
but exacerbate them. Indeed, reducing labor market distortions ceteris paribus requires
subsidies on capital income rather than taxes.
The insurance characteristic is identical in the expressions for both the labor and the
capital tax. Hence, insuring income through either labor or capital taxes provides the
same distributional bene¯ts. The reason is that the marginal propensity to save out of
¯rst-period labor income is equal to one, given that the ¯rst-period consumption and
labor supply choices are committed before the earnings shock is realized. Consequently,
a tax on saving is equivalent to a tax on labor income in terms of reducing the variance
in earnings. Thus, whether labor income should be taxed at a higher rate than capital
income depends only on whether the marginal costs of employing labor taxes are lower
than the marginal costs of employing capital income taxes. Therefore, an optimal policy
equalizes the marginal excess burdens of labor and capital taxes.
We obtain the optimal Ramsey-rule for the dual income tax structure by subtracting
equations (41) and (42) to ¯nd
Ã
^ ¿r= ^ R
1 ¡ ^ t
!
° ("c1t + "c1R) =
Ã
^ t + ^ ¿r= ^ R
1 ¡ ^ t
!
! ("l1t + "l1R): (43)
Our Ramsey-rule is intuitively the same as the optimal dual income tax in deterministic
Ramsey models with saving for retirement (see, e.g., Atkinson and Sandmo, 1980, equa-
tion (32)), but now in case of providing optimal social insurance, rather than raising an
exogenous amount of tax revenue with distorting tax instruments.8
The left-hand side represents the marginal welfare costs of employing the capital
income tax for income insurance. The cost of the capital tax increase with the tax wedge
on capital income
^ ¿r= ^ R
1¡^ t , and the total elasticity of ¯rst-period consumption °("c1t+"c1R) <
0, which measures the behavioral response of the savings base with respect to both tax
instruments combined. Both elasticities are negative. A higher capital tax distorts saving
by boosting ¯rst-period consumption. Additionally, a higher labor tax counters the saving
distortion by reducing ¯rst-period consumption. "c1t + "c1R gives the combined e®ect of
a higher capital tax while simultaneously reducing the labor tax. This term is always
negative.
Similarly, the right-hand side gives the welfare cost of using the labor income tax. The
cost of the labor tax increase with the net tax wedge on labor supply
^ t+^ ¿r= ^ R
1¡^ t , and the total
elasticity of the labor tax base !("l1t + "l1R) with respect to the two policy instruments.
8Note that there is an important di®erence with Atkinson and Sandmo (1980) in the optimal tax
formula, which is due to the fact that we cannot employ the symmetry of the Slutsky matrix. Conse-
quently, in our optimal Ramsey-rule the terms in brackets contain the elasticity of one tax base with
respect to all policy instruments employed, rather than the elasticity of all tax bases with respect to one
policy instrument employed.
19At ¯rst sight, the tax base elasticity appears ambiguous. On the one hand, an increase
in labor taxation will decrease labor supply: "l1t < 0. On the other hand, an increase
in the net interest rate boosts labor supply: "l1R > 0. By substituting the elasticities





(for "2 = 0). Intuitively, to reduce labor supply distortions the government would like
to provide a saving subsidy. However, the increase in labor taxes needed to ¯nance the
capital subsidy exacerbates the labor supply distortions, which would more than o®-set
the positive e®ect of the capital subsidy on labor supply.
Both tax wedges have the same sign at the optimum. Distortions in ¯rst-period labor
by a non-zero total tax wedge on labor supply should be equal to the distortions in
saving by a non-zero tax wedge on saving. Therefore, capital income is optimally taxed
(subsidized) at a positive rate ^ ¿r= ^ R > 0 (< 0) if labor income is taxed (subsidized) on
a net basis, i.e., if
^ t+^ ¿r= ^ R
1¡^ t > 0 (< 0). Below we demonstrate that the net tax on labor is
always positive so that capital income should always be taxed. Intuitively, starting from
a situation without taxes on capital income, introducing a small tax on capital income,
while lowering the labor tax at the same time, would produce no change in insurance
bene¯ts, since both instruments have identical insurance gains. Also, starting from a
zero capital tax, the introduction of a small capital tax would only generate second-
order intertemporal distortions in consumption. However, it would allow for a ¯rst-order
reduction in distortions in labor supply by lowering the labor tax. Thus, taxing capital
income helps to achieve the same insurance at lower e±ciency costs.
In the current setting the Atkinson-Stiglitz zero commodity-tax result can also never
be obtained as long as standard utility functions are adopted. In particular, zero taxa-
tion of capital income would require either that ¯rst-period consumption is zero (° = 0),
¯rst-period consumption is in¯nitely elastic (½1 ´ 1), or ¯rst-period labor supply is com-
pletely inelastic ("1 = 0), cf. the elasticities in Table 1. In these knife-edge cases the cap-
ital tax is either in¯nitely distortionary or the labor tax is completely non-distortionary.
Hence, in stark contrast to the deterministic Ramsey-models, positive taxation of capital
income is unambiguously part of the optimal tax policy under income risk.
By substituting (43) into the reduced ¯rst order conditions (41) and (42), and rear-
ranging and collecting terms, we ¯nd that the total net tax on labor satis¯es
^ t + ^ ¿r= ^ R









The optimal net tax on labor is positive by substituting the elasticities from Table 1.
Equation (44) gives the standard trade-o® between social insurance (numerator) and
distortions (denominator) and proves that the capital income tax is optimally positive,
cf. (43).
20The denominator represents the net distortions of taxing labor, which decrease the
optimal tax wedge on labor. In particular, distortions of social insurance increase with the
tax-elasticity of labor supply ¡"l1t > 0. Like before, the second term in the denominator,
"c1t
"l1R
"c1R > 0, captures the interaction between labor supply and saving. The stronger
the substitutability between ¯rst-period consumption and ¯rst-period labor supply, the
larger (in absolute value) is
"l1R
"c1R < 0. Thus, if capital taxes are higher, labor taxes
should be lower as they exacerbate the distortions of the capital tax on labor supply.
The interaction term is smaller if the cross-elasticity of consumption with respect to the
labor tax ("c1t < 0) is smaller (in absolute value). In that case, a higher labor tax does
not exacerbate labor supply distortions a lot.
The term in the numerator contains the standard, direct insurance gain of labor
taxes »1 > 0. In addition, there is also an indirect insurance gain of labor taxes, since
"c1t
»1
"c1R > 0. Intuitively, the labor tax reduces ¯rst-period consumption "c1t < 0, and
thereby reduces the distortions of the capital tax on consumption choices. As a result,
the trade-o® between insurance and distortions of employing capital taxes improves, as
indicated by the term
»1
"c1R < 0. Therefore, if the labor tax improves the insurance-
incentives trade-o® of the capital tax, "c1t
»1
"c1R is larger, and the optimal wedge on labor
should increase accordingly.
By using the optimal tax wedge on labor (44) in the optimal dual tax structure in
equation (43), we obtain the optimal capital tax rate
^ ¿r= ^ R













Upon substitution of the relevant elasticities from Table 1 we can derive that the optimal
capital tax is indeed unambiguously positive and increases with the desire to insure risk
in ¯rst-period income »1. The larger the ¯rst-period labor income share relative to ¯rst-
period consumption, the larger is !
°, and the broader is the saving tax base compared to
the labor tax base. Hence, for this mechanical reason the capital tax should optimally
increase.
The denominator in brackets represents the welfare cost of the capital tax. Welfare
losses of capital income taxes increase in the elasticity of consumption with respect to the
interest rate (¡"c1R > 0). Capital taxes exacerbate the distortions of the labor tax on
labor supply, so that the e±ciency losses in saving increase even more, cf. "l1R
"c1t
"l1t > 0.
The ¯rst term in the numerator, »1, designates the direct insurance gain of capital
taxes, whereas "l1R
»1
"l1t < 0 represents again the indirect insurance e®ect. Capital taxes
should be higher if this provides a lot of distributional bene¯ts. However, by lowering
¯rst-period labor supply ("l1R > 0), capital income taxes worsen the insurance-incentives
trade-o® of the labor tax, which is captured by
»1
"l1t < 0. As a result, capital income taxes
21reduce the attractiveness of using labor income taxes to insure income risks, and should
be lowered accordingly.
We can eliminate ¿r
R from the optimal wedge on labor supply in equation (44) to ¯nd
the optimal labor tax
^ t

















The labor tax is generally ambiguous in sign. The reason is that the capital tax is part
of the labor wedge. If the optimal capital tax becomes larger, a negative labor tax t < 0
might be necessary in order maintain the optimal net tax wedge on labor (t+¿r
1¡t > 0).
The condition for optimally positive labor taxes is ! ("l1t + "l1R) > °("c1t + "c1R). This












We assume that this condition holds and that the labor tax is optimally positive. Note
however that the sign of the capital tax does not depend on this assumption, so the result
that capital income should optimally be taxed remains unchanged.
To conclude, subsidies on saving could boost labor supply of the young workers in
the saving-for-retirement model. However, this is not an optimal policy. A negative
capital tax raises the exposure to labor income risk. Hence, a rise in the labor tax is
needed to maintain the same level of insurance. Intuitively, keeping the level of income
insurance constant implies that the labor tax needs to increase as the capital tax is
lowered. However, a negative capital tax combined with a higher labor tax so as to keep
the level of social insurance constant generates larger distortions. The reason is that
the rise in the labor tax more than o®-sets the positive impact of the saving subsidy
on labor supply. Consequently, capital income (i.e., retirement income in this context)
should not be subsidized, but taxed so as to provide social insurance at the lowest social
cost. Therefore, these results suggest that policies to subsidize retirement plans are
questionable, because the distortions associated with a rise in the tax burden to ¯nance
the tax-subsidies outweigh their bene¯cial e®ects on labor supply.
Proposition 2. (Exogenous second-period leisure) The optimal capital tax is positive.
It is equally e®ective as the labor tax in providing social insurance. The optimal capital
tax increases i) with the desire to insure income risk and, ii) when capital taxes are less
distortionary compared to labor taxes, i.e., when intertemporal distortions in consumption
are small, substitutability between ¯rst-period labor supply and ¯rst-period consumption
is small, and the labor supply elasticity is large.
226 General model
In the general model, in which labor supply in both periods is endogenous, we have the
following expression describing the optimal labor tax from rearranging equation (35):
















The expression for the optimal labor tax equates the insurance gains of reducing risk
in ¯rst- and second period incomes, !»1 + (1 ¡ !)»2, to the net marginal cost of doing
so. The welfare costs of labor taxes are represented by three terms. The ¯rst two terms
give the marginal excess burdens of labor taxes on ¯rst- and second period labor supply,
respectively. Note that ¡!"l1t > 0, and ¡(1 ¡ !)"l2t > 0. The last term gives the
reduction in the excess burden of a positive capital tax, since the labor tax partially
o®-sets the saving distortion by discouraging ¯rst-period consumption (°"c1t < 0).

















Note that, in contrast to the labor income tax, the capital tax can only be employed for
insurance reasons to reduce the risk of ¯rst-period incomes (!»1), not second-period in-
comes ((1¡!)»2). The reason is that the second-period income shock occurs after savings
have been made. Hence, taxing savings does not help to reduce the variance of incomes
in the second period of the life-cycle. The marginal insurance gains !»1 should again
be equal to the net marginal dead weight loss associated with more income insurance.
In particular, a capital tax causes the standard saving distortion which is represented
by ¡
¿r=R
1¡t °"c1R > 0. Moreover, the capital tax exacerbates the labor tax distortions on
¯rst-period labor supply since !"l1R > 0. This is, ¯rst, due to wealth e®ects arising
from intertemporal substitution in consumption. Second, in the general model with en-
dogenous labor supply in both periods, capital taxes also generate direct intertemporal
substitution e®ects on leisure demands so that ¯rst-period labor supply falls. Finally, the
capital tax reduces distortions in second-period labor supply, because t
1¡t(1¡!)"l2R < 0
for positive labor taxes. Wealth e®ects due to intertemporal substitution in consumption
and intertemporal substitution in leisure both raise second-period labor supply.
By combining both equations we obtain the optimal dual tax structure:
µ
^ ¿r=R
1 ¡ ^ t
¶
° ("c1t + "c1R) =
µ^ t + ^ ¿r=R
1 ¡ ^ t
¶
! ("l1t + "l1R) (50)
+
µ ^ t
1 ¡ ^ t
¶
(1 ¡ !)("l2t + "l2R) + (1 ¡ !)»2
23The optimal capital tax is determined by four elements. The two elements in the ¯rst
line are identical to the expression for the optimal capital tax of the previous section, see
equation (43).
First, the optimal capital income tax
^ ¿r=R
1¡^ t is larger if ¯rst-period consumption has
a lower total elasticity with respect to the policy instruments and the income share of
consumption today is lower (lower °), so that ° ("c1t + "c1R) < 0 is lower in absolute
value. Naturally, the capital tax distorts intertemporal consumption choices ("c1R < 0).
In addition, the labor tax reduces the capital tax distortions by reducing overconsumption
in the ¯rst period ("c1t < 0) { provided that the capital tax is positive. The net e®ect is
negative, see also the previous section.






! ("l1t + "l1R) is higher in absolute value. Note that the distortion is
larger if individuals earn a relatively large fraction of their life-time income ! in the
¯rst period. The intuition for this term is identical to the model with only endogenous
¯rst-period labor supply. In particular, a capital subsidy could be employed to reduce
the labor tax distortion. However, the rise in labor taxes to maintain the same level of
income insurance could more than o®-set the positive e®ects of the capital subsidy on
labor supply. In contrast to the previous section the net e®ect is no longer unambiguous,




1¡t ¡ ½1(1 ¡ ¼2)(1 ¡ !)"2
¢
? 0. Intuitively, in the current model
with endogenous leisure in both periods, intertemporal substitution e®ects in the pattern
of leisure demand over time provide an additional channel whereby capital income taxes
a®ect labor supply, besides the wealth e®ects generated by intertemporal substitution
in consumption. In particular, a larger capital income tax renders current leisure more
attractive than future leisure. As a result, the capital tax raises the distortion on ¯rst-
period labor supply even further, thereby reducing the desire to tax capital incomes.
This intertemporal substitution e®ect in leisure is absent in the models with only one
leisure demand decision. Hence, only if intertemporal substitution e®ects in leisure are




1¡^ t(1 ¡ !)("l2t + "l2R) < 0 indicates the role of capital taxes to reduce the
tax distortion on second-period labor supply. The combined elasticity is unambiguously
signed: "l2t + "l2R < 0. A larger capital tax allows for a lower labor tax, so that labor
tax distortions on second-period labor supply diminish. In addition, a capital tax boosts
second-period labor supply through intertemporal substitution e®ects so that it alleviates
the distortions of the labor tax on second-period labor supply even more. Accordingly,
a positive capital tax ceteris paribus allows for more social insurance by reducing the
distortions in second-period labor supply.
Fourth, the capital tax increases if labor taxes are less e±cient in social insurance,
thus, if (1¡!)»2 is lower, i.e, if second-period risk is relatively less important compared to
24¯rst-period income risk (note that the previous three terms discussed so far are negative.)
Indeed, in the absence of second-period labor income risk (»2), capital income is generally
taxed at positive rates if intertemporal substitution of leisure is modest and if labor
supplies in both periods are taxed at net positive rates. Consequently, capital income
taxes help to reduce moral hazard in social insurance. However, if second-period labor
income is substantially more risky than ¯rst-period income, »2 is larger, and capital
income taxes loose their attractiveness as an insurance device. Therefore, capital income
taxes tend to be set lower.
We can derive an explicit condition under which capital income should be taxed at
positive rates when capital taxes do not provide insurance at all, i.e., if the saving base
is deterministic. Capital income taxes are then employed for e±ciency reasons only. In









Capital income is taxed if labor income is taxed (t > 0), and the positive e®ect of capital
income taxes on second-period labor supply ((1 ¡!)"l2R < 0) is larger than the negative
e®ect of capital income taxes on ¯rst-period labor supply (!"l1R > 0). The denominator
is always negative. The net e®ect thus depends on the intertemporal substitution pattern
in labor supply and the relative shares of labor earned in the ¯rst- and the second-period
of the life-cycle (!). Theoretically, the sign of the capital tax is ambiguous. If the major
part of income would be earned in the ¯rst period, i.e, if ! was high, and if ¯rst-period
labor supply was very sensitive to changes in the interest rate, i.e., if there would be strong
intertemporal substitution e®ects in leisure, then we might have !"l1R +(1¡!)"l2R > 0,
so that we obtain a case where saving would be optimally subsidized. Therefore, a model
where income risk is only due to (disability or health) risk when old and where the
government is mainly concerned with fostering labor supply of younger workers could
motivate real world tax reliefs (or even direct subsidies) on retirement bene¯ts, as, e.g.,
in the case of IRA accounts in the U.S. or of \Riester-Rente" in Germany.
Given hump-shaped earnings pro¯les, second-period labor income is typically more
important than ¯rst-period labor income, hence ! < 1=2. There is little empirical evi-
dence on the cross-elasticities of labor supply with respect to the net interest rate. In
realistically calibrated life-cycle models Erosa and Gervais (2002) and Conesa et al. (2009)
¯nd that optimal capital taxes are generally positive for e±ciency reasons as a result of
intertemporal substitution e®ects in leisure only. In particular, the capital tax reduces
labor supply at earlier stages of the life-cycle more than the increases in labor supply at
later stages. This evidence suggests, therefore, that !"l1R+(1¡!)"l2R < 0. Accordingly,
capital income should optimally be taxed, even if capital income taxes do not provide
any insurance gains.
25Returning to the general case of skill shocks in both periods of the life-cycle, we
¯nd the optimal capital tax rate from solving equation (49) for the labor tax t
1¡t and
substituting the resulting expression into equation (48). Collecting terms and rearranging
then delivers
^ ¿r= ^ R
1 ¡ ^ t
=
!»1 + ¹ "lR
[!»1+(1¡!)»2]
¹ "lt




where ¹ "lR = !"l1R+(1¡!)"l2R and ¹ "lt = !"l1t+(1¡!)"l2t < 0 denote the income-weighted
average elasticities of total labor supply with respect to the interest factor and the labor
tax rate. According to the discussion in the last paragraph, we maintain the assumption
that ¹ "lR = !"l1R + (1 ¡ !)"l2R < 0. The expression "aR ´ !"l1R ¡ °"c1R > 0 denotes
the compensated interest rate elasticity of savings. It is unambiguously positive, because
a higher net interest rate increases ¯rst-period labor supply ("l1R > 0) and decreases
¯rst-period consumption ("c1R < 0). "at ´ !"l1t ¡ °"c1t is the elasticity of saving with
respect to the labor tax. If "at > 0 ("at < 0), saving increases (decreases) as a result
of labor taxation. The sign of "at is ambiguous since labor taxation both reduces labor
supply (!"l1t < 0) and ¯rst-period consumption (°"c1t < 0).
By assuming that ¹ "lR < 0, (52) demonstrates that the optimal capital tax is positive
in the general case as well.9;10 The ¯rst term in the denominator represents the direct
distortions in savings, i.e., intertemporal distortions in ¯rst-period consumption and in
¯rst-period labor supply, respectively. The larger are direct intertemporal distortions on
consumption and leisure, the larger is "aR > 0, and the lower the optimal capital tax
should be. Again, a complementarity-e®ect between saving and labor supply is at work.
This e®ect is captured by the last term in the denominator. Labor taxation mitigates
distortions in savings, if labor taxes boost savings ("at > 0), but distort labor supply
(¹ "lt < 0). This trade-o® is represented by "at
¹ "lt . If "at > 0 capital taxation boosts labor
supply (¹ "lR < 0), and thereby alleviates the distortions of the labor tax on labor supply.
Therefore, capital taxes should be set higher. If, instead, "at < 0, a higher capital tax
exacerbates the savings distortions of the labor tax by boosting life-time labor supply.
Thus, ¹ "lR
"at
¹ "lt < 0, and capital taxation should decrease for "at < 0.
The numerator of equation (52) captures the insurance e®ects of capital taxes and
consists of two parts. First, there is the direct insurance e®ect !»1. If taxing savings
reduces the exposure to ¯rst-period income risk more, capital income taxes should be
higher. This is analogous to the explanation in the saving-for-retirement case in section
5. Additionally, the indirect insurance e®ect is at work. In particular, if the capital tax
boosts labor supply, ¹ "lR < 0, the capital tax improves the insurance-incentives trade-o® of
the labor tax, since
[!»1+(1¡!)»2]
¹ "lt < 0. As a result the labor tax becomes a more attractive
9Second-order conditions for the optimal tax problem ensure that the denominator of the optimal tax
expression is positive.
10Note that the term exactly simpli¯es to the optimal capital tax rule (45), if second-period labor
supply is inelastic ("l2t = "l2R = 0), and if there is no risk in the second period (»2 = 0).
26instrument for social insurance, and the capital tax should optimally increase.
To derive the optimal labor tax, we insert equation (52) into equation (49) and collect




!»1 + (1 ¡ !)»2 + "at
!»1
"aR




The denominator shows that the optimal labor tax falls if providing social insurance is
more distortionary. The labor tax distorts labor supply as represented by the average
labor supply elasticity (¹ "lt < 0). However, the labor tax is larger if the capital tax is
helpful in reducing labor market distortions by indirectly boosting labor supply (¹ "lR < 0),
and if the labor tax strengthens the complementarity-e®ect
¹ "lR
"aR < 0 by raising savings
("at > 0). Instead, if the labor tax reduces overall saving ("at < 0), it weakens the
complementarity-e®ect of capital taxation. Consequently, distortions from labor taxation
will be exacerbated, and the labor tax should be set at a lower rate. The numerator reveals
that the optimal labor tax increases with the desire to insure income risk in both periods
(!»1 + (1 ¡ !)»2). Finally, there is the indirect insurance e®ect of the tax policy. If "at
is positive, the labor tax improves the insurance-incentives trade-o® of the capital tax.
As a result, the optimal tax on labor income needs to be higher as a result. The reverse
reasoning holds if "at < 0. Proposition 3 summarizes the results of this section.
Proposition 3. (Leisure endogenous in both periods) The capital tax is optimally positive
if there is weak intertemporal substitution in leisure demands over the life-cycle and the
disadvantages of capital taxes over labor taxes to insure income risk are small, i.e., if labor
income risks occur mainly at the beginning of the life-cycle. The capital tax is employed
for both insurance and e±ciency reasons. The capital tax directly insures ¯rst-period labor
income risk. In addition, the capital tax allows for a lower total marginal tax burden on
¯rst-period labor supply { for given levels of insurance { and reduces moral hazard in
second-period labor supply.
7 Conclusions
This paper has demonstrated that capital income is generally taxed in a standard two-
period life-cycle model with non-insurable risks in both periods of the life-cycle. The
Atkinson-Stiglitz theorem of non-di®erentiation of commodity taxes breaks down under
risk. Intuitively, capital income taxes boost second-period labor supply by making future
leisure more costly. Taxing capital income thus reduces moral hazard in second-period
labor supply (or retirement). However, capital income taxes reduce ¯rst-period labor
supply, but this e®ect is generally o®-set because capital taxes also allow for a lower level
of labor taxation. Indeed, optimal social insurance requires that distortions associated
27with insurance should be smoothed over labor income and saving bases.
This paper employed linear policy instruments and con¯rmed results from the new
dynamic public ¯nance literature where rich sets of non-linear instruments are analyzed,
see for example Golosov et al. (2003), Kocherlakota (2005), Golosov et al. (2006), and
Diamond (2006), Albanesi and Sleet (2006), and Golosov and Tsyvinski (2006). All
these papers emphasize that intertemporal wedges are optimal to relax the incentive
constraints associated with social insurance. By introducing intertemporal wedges in
consumption choices, individuals with favorable skill-shocks are less tempted to mimic
individuals with unfavorable skill-shocks. We show that this main intuition is applicable
as well with linear tax instruments. Capital income taxes are desirable to reduce moral
hazard in social insurance. In contrast to the non-linear policy instruments, we have
also demonstrated that capital taxes have a direct role in insuring labor market risks,
especially when labor risks are important in the early stages of the life-cycle. This ¯nding
is similar to the desirability of indirect instruments for redistributional reasons, besides
optimally employing a linear income tax in optimal redistribution models, cf. Atkinson
and Stiglitz (1976).
Our ¯ndings have large policy relevance for the debate on the tax treatment of pension
savings and stimulating later retirement. We show that (retirement) saving should gener-
ally be taxed, and not subsidized. Consequently, actuarially fair retirement schemes are
not optimal. Governments should not try to subsidize retirement saving so as to reduce
future public spending on state pensions or health care. By doing this, sustainability
problems in public ¯nances worsen rather than improve, since the government needs to
raise the tax burden on working-age individuals, which results in larger labor market
distortions and smaller tax bases { as long as governments do not wish to sacri¯ce on
social insurance. Moreover, subsidies on (pension) saving increase moral hazard in social
insurance by boosting the incentives to retire earlier. Hence, a policy of subsidies on
(retirement) savings does not help to delay retirement either.
Appendix { Deriving compensated elasticities under
risk
To derive the compensated elasticities we log-linearize the ¯rst-order conditions and the
expected utility function, where we set the change in the latter to zero. We focus on
the elasticities of expected consumption and labor supply in both periods with respect to
deterministic (expected) changes in policies. Hence, we can employ the concept of global
risk aversion (see, e.g., Varian, 1992, p. 380). We de¯ne global relative risk aversion
in consumption as ½i ´ ¡E[u00
i (ci)]E[ci]
E[u0
i(ci)] > 0. "i ´ E[v00
i (li)]E[µili]
E[v0
i(li)]E[µi] > 0 is a measure for the
expected compensated labor supply elasticity in period i = 1;2.
28The log-linearized utility function is given by
c1u
0
1~ c1 ¡ l1v
0
1~ l1 + ¯E[c2]E[u
0





2]~ l2 = 0; (54)
where a tilde (~) denotes a relative change, e.g., ~ ci ´ E[dci]
E[ci] is the relative change in the
expected value of ci, and ~ li ´ E[d(µili)]
E[µili] is the relative change in li, and where we used that
fact that E[d(µ2l2)] = E[µ2]E[dl2], because we are evaluating the change for a given µ1 and
because l2 is chosen before µ2 realizes.
Substituting the households' ¯rst-order conditions for labor supply and consumption
in the linearized utility function, we ¯nd, after rearranging,
Rc1~ c1 + E[c2]~ c2 ¡ (1 ¡ ¼1)(1 ¡ t)RE[µ1]l1~ l1 ¡ E[µ2l2](1 ¡ ¼2)(1 ¡ t)~ l2 = 0: (55)
Hence,
°~ c1 + (1 ¡ °)~ c2 ¡ (1 ¡ ¼1)(1 ¡ t)!~ l1 ¡ (1 ¡ ¼2)(1 ¡ t)(1 ¡ !)~ l2 = 0: (56)
We de¯ned ° ´
Rc1
RE[µ1]l1+E[µ2l2] and (1 ¡ °) = E[c2]
RE[µ1]l1+E[µ2l2] as the expected expenditure
shares of consumption in both periods and ! ´
RE[µ1]l1
RE[µ1]l1+E[µ2l2] and 1¡! ´ E[µ2l2]
RE[µ1]l1+E[µ2l2]
as the expected share of labor income in period i = 1;2 in total labor income (before
taxes).
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2]E[µi] > 0, as long as we assume non-increasing absolute risk aversion
(u000
2 > 0). Since the ¼0
i terms are normalized covariances, they are always smaller than or
equal to one: 0 · ¼i · 1.































Using the de¯nitions of the labor supply elasticities and rearranging yields
~ l1 = "1
³
¡~ t + ~ R
´
¡ §1"1½2~ c2; (65)




1¡¼1 ¸ 0 and §2 ´
1¡¼0
2
1¡¼2 ¸ 0, since 0 · ¼i · 1.
Together with the linearized Euler consumption equation and the linearized utility
function we have a linear system of four equations in four unknowns which can be solved
to ¯nd the elasticities. First, substitute the linearized Euler equation (60) in the other
three linearized equations (56), (65), and (66) to ¯nd
~ l1 = ¡"1~ t + "1 (1 ¡ §1) ~ R ¡ §1"1½1~ c1; (67)














Use the ¯rst two equations to substitute for ~ l1 and ~ l2 in the last equation to ¯nd the
solution of the model for ~ c1:














+ (1 ¡ ¼1)!§1"1½1 + (1 ¡ ¼2)(1 ¡ !)§2"2½1
#
~ c1:
Using the last result in (67), (68) and (60) we can write the solution of the complete
30model as


























































+ (1 ¡ ¼1)!§1"1½1 + (1 ¡ ¼2)(1 ¡ !)§2"2½1 > 0; (75)




+ (1 ¡ ¼1)!"1 (1 ¡ §1) ¡ (1 ¡ ¼2)(1 ¡ !)"2§2: (77)
² is a measure for the weighted labor supply elasticity where the certainty equivalent of
each period's income is used as a weight.
We can sign the following elasticities. First, the consumption elasticities with respect
to the tax rate are unambiguously signed: "c1t < 0, "c2t < 0. Next, the elasticity of
second period consumption with respect to the interest factor is unambiguous as well,





1¡t + (1 ¡ ¼1)!"1½1
¤
> 0. Second, as long as we assume
± < 0, the ¯rst-period consumption elasticity with respect to the interest factor will be
negative, "c1R < 0 and standard saving behavior is obtained. This assumption holds true
if either there is no ¯rst-period income, if ¼0
1 ¡ ¼1 is su±ciently small, or if the tax labor
tax rate t is su±ciently high. For ± < 0, a higher net interest factor makes ¯rst-period
consumption less attractive and second-period consumption more attractive. These signs
of the elasticities would also be found in the absence of risk.
Third, the elasticity of second-period labor supply with respect to the interest factor






(1¡t) + (1 ¡ ¼1)!"1½1
´
>
0. Moreover, if ± is negative, then 0 < 1 +
½1±
¢ < 1. Consequently, the ¯rst-period




§1 < 0 in that case. The latter assumption is equivalent to assuming ¼0
1 > ¼1.
This is a relatively weak requirement. For the special case of multivariate normally
distributed skill shocks, it can be shown that this assumption is equivalent to require
(global) absolute prudence being larger than (global) absolute risk aversion. The latter
holds for most utility functions and should also carry over under uncertainty under mild
conditions.
Fourth, we assume that the substitution e®ect is dominant to obtain standard labor
31supply behavior, i.e. "lit < 0. Thus, we impose 1 ¡ §i
½1²









(1¡¼1)!"1. Therefore, a su±cient condition to ensure
standard behavior of labor supply is that the di®erence between §1 and §2 is not too
large (or that they are close to being equal) such that §1 ¼ §2 holds.
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